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Previewsis important to note that interneurons in
the OB receive inputs from the olfactory
cortex and neuromodulatory systems,
raising the possibility that gain control
can itself be shaped by these inputs.
Furthermore, considering the coarse che-
motopy in OB and the spatial scale of PVN
inputs, these gain modulations might be
loosely domain or chemical specific.
Future studies should examine whether
the activity of PVNs is modulated by
animal state, such as attention or arousal.
Gain control is a fundamental property
of the brain, allowing for efficient coding
of information in different sensory envi-
ronments and behavioral states. The
studies of Kato et al. (2013) andMiyamichi
et al. (2013) bring us one step closer to
understanding how gain control is imple-
mented by neural circuits.REFERENCES
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Learning models propose a role for both signed and unsigned prediction errors in updating associations
between cues and aversive outcomes. In this issue ofNeuron, Klavir et al. (2013) show how these errors arise
from the interplay between the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex.Learning is a life-long endeavor,
demanding that we constantly track and
update the outcomes we associate with
specific stimuli, so that we quickly learn
not to respond to stimuli we encounter
today with reactions that were appro-
priate yesterday. Indeed, a lack of cogni-
tive flexibility can be a setback in daily
life and, if serious enough, a sign of neuro-
logical distress. A critical driving force
behind learning is prediction error, the
discrepancy between expected and
actual outcome. Influential models from
learning theory propose different means
for updating stimulus-outcome associa-
tions to correct for prediction error,bringing predictions in line with current
conditions. For example, in the Re-
scorla-Wagner model, associations are
updatedwhen the unconditioned stimulus
(US) violates previously established ex-
pectations, increasing in associational
strength with the cue if the US is bigger
than expected and decreasing in strength
if the US is smaller than expected (Re-
scorla and Wagner, 1972). Thus, in this
model the prediction error is signed,
driving the strength of cue-outcome asso-
ciations upward (positive) if expectations
are exceeded and downward (or negative)
if expectations are unmet. Conversely, in
the Pearce-Hall and Mackintosh models,the prediction error is unsigned. If a cue
produces an outcome that is different
(whether more or less) than expected,
more attention is given to the conditioned
stimulus (CS), thereby strengthening the
cue-outcome association regardless of
the sign of the prediction error (Pearce
and Hall, 1980; Mackintosh, 1975). Appe-
titive learning studies, in which reward is
unexpectedly delivered or omitted, sup-
port the coexistence of both models and
demonstrate that signed and unsigned er-
rors are represented across a distributed
network of brain regions (Schultz et al.,
1997; Roesch et al., 2010). However, the
neural substrates of prediction errorecember 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 1109
Figure 1. Error Signals in the Amygdala and
Dorsal Anterior Cingulate
Amygdala neurons representing unsigned predic-
tion errors (top) increase their firing rates to both
positive (CS– to CS+) and negative (CS+ to CS–)
prediction errors during reversal learning. Activity
in these ‘‘unsigned error’’ neurons precedes that
in dACC neurons. Firing rates in amygdala neurons
representing signed prediction errors (bottom)
change rates in opposite directions for the two
types of error. Activity in these ‘‘signed error’’ neu-
rons follows that in dACC neurons. These findings
suggest that unsigned errors arise in the amygdala
and are sent to the dACC, where the error signal
is given a sign before being returned to the
amygdala.
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Previewsduring aversive learning, in which a ‘‘pos-
itive’’ error—the surprising presence of a
stimulus—results in the delivery of an
aversive experience, have not been as
well explored.
To investigate the temporal develop-
ment of neural coding associated with
aversive learning, Klavir et al. (2013), in
this issue of Neuron, simultaneously re-
corded from two areas known to support
this task: the amygdala and the anterior
cingulate cortex. Critically, Klavir et al.
(2013) identify differential sequences of
information processing in this circuit de-
pending on whether neurons respond to
signed or unsigned prediction errors.
The group recorded units in the dorsal
anterior cingulate (dACC) and in distrib-
uted locations of the basolateral nuclei
of the amygdala (BLA) whilemonkeys per-
formed a trace-conditioning task in which
an auditory or a visual stimulus predicted
either an aversive air puff to the eye (CS+)
or no air puff (CS). Once the association1110 Neuron 80, December 4, 2013 ª2013 Ewas learned, as evidenced by selective
preparatory blinking to the CS+, the con-
tingencies reversed. Klavir et al. (2013)
show that successfully learning the
reversal increases the functional connec-
tivity between the dACC and BLA and im-
poses an error sign-dependent temporal
order on informationprocessing (Figure 1).
Amygdala cells that increase their firing
rate in response to both positive and
negative prediction errors (as in the un-
signed errors of the Pearce-Hall model)
precede activity in the dACC. Conversely,
amygdala cells that change their firing
rate in opposite directions to the two error
types (and therefore encode signed er-
rors, as proposed by the Rescorla-Wag-
ner model), fire after those in the dACC.
These findings suggest that unsigned er-
rors first propagate from the amygdala
to the dACC, where they are given a sign
and returned to the amygdala. Thus, the
dense reciprocal connectivity of this cir-
cuit allows for processing of both signed
and unsigned prediction errors by differ-
entially controlling the directionality of
information transfer. Given data from
depressed patients indicating signifi-
cantly compromised prediction error up-
dating (Gradin et al., 2011), characterizing
the strengths and vulnerabilities of this
circuit would be of potential clinical
relevance.
Early amygdala firing to surprising pres-
ence or absence of the aversive US, as
shown in the Klavir et al. (2013) study, is
similar to amygdala activity in processing
unsigned prediction errors in appetitive
tasks that use reward as a US (Roesch
et al., 2010). Collectively, these data sug-
gest that cells in the amygdala are highly
tuned to any changes in the environment,
constituting an ideal neural substrate for
sign-free, attention-related error process-
ing as described by the Pearce-Hall
model. Given that the amygdala is an
evolutionarily conserved structure with a
central role in processing threat and
orchestrating defensive reactions, it is
appropriate that the amygdala is an effec-
tive detector of unexpected changes
related to aversive stimuli. In support of
this idea, the amygdala has been identi-
fied as a critical site for processing unpre-
dictable stimuli that are not associated
with a US of any value (Herry et al.,
2007). Moreover, amygdala activity
induced by surprising stimuli in humanslsevier Inc.was followed by enhanced attention
toward upcoming threatening stimuli
(Herry et al., 2007). An amygdala-medi-
ated increase in attention to and salience
of the CS, as suggested by the Pearce-
Hall model, is consistent with the known
role of this structure in emotional arousal
and enhanced memory consolidation
(McGaugh, 2013). Indeed, substantial ev-
idence indicates that emotional arousal
is accompanied by the release of gluco-
corticoids and activation of b-adrenergic
receptors in the amygdala, processes
that are essential for long-term memory
consolidation in humans and in rodents
(McGaugh, 2013). Simply put, emotional
events are remembered better. Given
that memory consolidation is a time-
dependent process that occurs after
training, it would be interesting to see if,
after the surprise of the reversal in
aversive contingencies of a given CS,
the learning rate of the new stimulus-
outcome associations is dependent on
memory consolidation in the amygdala.
If so, it would suggest that unsigned
error-related increases in amygdala
firing can lead to longer-lasting changes
in intracellular signaling cascades that
ultimately alter the state of amygdala
cells during learning.
Seminal work has shown that signed
errors in reward processing, as predicted
by the Rescorla-Wagner model, are
mediated by dopaminergic neurons
(Schultz et al., 1997). Furthermore, inhibi-
tory neurons in the ventral tegmental
area are active throughout the CS-US
delay and, in contrast to the dopami-
nergic cells, fire during the delivery of
aversive as well as the rewarding stimuli
(Cohen et al., 2012). Thus, interaction
between the excitatory drive onto
dopaminergic cells and local inhibition
along their dendrites and soma probably
participates in the updating of CS-US
associational strength during prediction
error learning and during dopaminergic
silencing during aversive outcomes.
Notably, it has also been demonstrated
that normal appetitive error signaling in
the striatum depends on input from the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Takahashi
et al., 2011). In this work, the orbitofrontal
signal was proposed to send contextual
information to striatal cells, sculpting the
striatal response as a function of the
external context. Similarly, in the present
Neuron
Previewsstudy, Klavir et al. (2013) found that activ-
ity of signed dACC cells precedes activity
of amygdala cells, suggesting that once
the unsigned element of surprise is pro-
cessed in the amygdala, dACC cells
become active and could then in turn
exert a top-down influence on the amyg-
dala in signed prediction errors. An impor-
tant goal for the future is to understand
how amygdala and dACC inputs use the
available local networks to shape the
sign of an error by regulating the excit-
atory-inhibitory balance.
These intriguing similarities between
frontal-striatal and frontal-amygdala cir-
cuits in updating prediction errors of
rewarding and aversive conditioned
stimuli, respectively, suggest that these
networks rely on similar processing
strategies.Whatmay unite the two circuits
is amygdala activity. The very nature of
early amygdala activation to unsigned
errors, as shown by Klavir et al. (2013)
and others (Herry et al., 2007, Roesch
et al., 2010), should influence those
systems that are learning about both
rewarding and aversive stimuli. In line
with this idea, presentation of fearful faces
tohumansubjects activated theamygdala
and sped up the rate of cue-reward asso-
ciation learning and amygdala-striata-
interactions (Watanabe et al., 2013).
Thus, arousal via amygdala activation
has the hallmark attributes of the Pearce-
Hall model and can influence prediction
error learning rates in cue-reward (Wata-
nabe et al., 2013) and cue-aversive (Herry
et al., 2007) associations, where signature
elements of the Rescora-Wagner model
are enacted in parallel systems.One important task remaining is to
integrate these findings into the growing
body of data linking amygdala activity
to value, particularly through interactions
with the OFC. Recordings from similar
reversal tasks demonstrate that amyg-
dala neurons represent the value of
learned stimuli, including the sign of that
value (Paton et al., 2006). Simultaneous
amygdala and OFC recordings have
demonstrated a complex dance between
the two structures during the reversal
learning process, one in which amygdala
neurons more quickly acquire negative
value representations, while OFC neu-
rons more quickly acquire positive value
representations (Morrison et al., 2011). It
is not immediately clear how these
signed value representations compare
to the signed and unsigned prediction er-
ror representations described by Klavir
et al. (2013). Also remaining to be puzzled
out is how the dance between the amyg-
dala and OFC compares to that between
the amygdala and the dACC, and
whether these circuits are activated seri-
ally or in parallel. Presumably, prediction
errors are used to update value represen-
tations, and these updates require signed
errors. It is therefore intriguing to imagine
that inputs from the dACC and OFC
converge within the amgydala, where
signed errors from the dACC update
stimulus-value encoding at OFC-amyg-
dala synapses. Such computations
occurring at multiple stages of top-
down processing would create a pliable
network capable of flexibly assigning
meaning to the ever-surprising world
around us.Neuron 80, DREFERENCES
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